The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973

Russia's forceful re-entry into the Middle Eastern arena, and the accentuated continuity of Soviet policy and methods of the 1960s and '70s, highlight the topicality of this groundbreaking study, which confirms the USSR's role in shaping Middle Eastern and global history. This book covers the peak of the USSR's direct military involvement in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The head-on clash between US-armed Israeli forces and some 20,000 Soviet servicemen with state-of-the-art weaponry turned the Middle East into the hottest front of the Cold War. The Soviets' success in this war of attrition paved the way for their planning and support of Egypt's cross-canal offensive in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Ginor and Remez challenge a series of long-accepted notions as to the scope, timeline and character of the Soviet intervention and overturn the conventional view that d?tente with the US induced Moscow to restrainthat a US-Moscow d?tente led to a curtailment of Egyptian ambitions to recapture of the land it lost to Israel in 1967. Between this analytical rethink and the introduction of an entirely new genre of sources-- -memoirs and other publications by Soviet veterans themselves---The Soviet-Israeli War paves the way for scholars to revisit this pivotal moment in world history.

Autorentext
Isabella Ginor is a fellow of the Truman Institute, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and former Soviet/Russian affairs specialist for Haaretz newspaper. Gideon Remez is a fellow of the Truman Institute, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and former head of foreign news, Israel Radio. Ginor's and Remez's previous book, Foxbats over Dimona (2007), won the silver medal in the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's inaugural book prize competition.

Inhalt
Foreword PART ONE: "WE WILL NOT LEAVE EGYPT IN THE LURCH" 1. Rescuing and Rearming the USSR's Allies in June 1967 2. Holding the Line on the Suez Canal 3. The Soviet Presence Is Formalized and Expanded PART TWO: OPERATION KAVKAZ 4. Framing the Cross-Canal Goal and the Attrition Strategy 5. The Nuclear Non-issue 6. "Yellow Arab Helmet, Blue Russian Eyes" 7. Facing the Barlev Line 8. A New Phase from March '69? 9. What Triggered Kavkaz? Refuting Heikal's Version 10. Dr. Chazov's "Vacation in Egypt" 11. The Soviet Regulars Move in 12. Operation Kavkaz is Formally Organized 13. The Soviet-Israeli Battle is Joined 14. "A Famous Indiscretion" as the Air War Peaks 15. A MIA Mystery and Soviet Intelligence Methods 16. SAM Successes and a MiG Debacle 17. Ceasefire Violation Seals a Strategic Gain PART THREE: A DECEPTIVE END 18. Sadat Proves his Stability and Loyalty 19. Return of the Foxbats 20. Trial Balloons from Both Sides 21. Flexing Muscles while Offering a Pullback 22. Jockeying and Posturing 23. The Deal at the Summit and the "Expulsion" Myth 24. Withdrawn Regulars Conceal "Banished" Advisers 25. Deception-on- Nile, July 1972 26. The Soviets "Return" in October PART FOUR: "WE PREPARED THE WAR" 27. "We Can't Control the Arabs but Must Support Them" 28. "We Will Be Two Ismails" 29. The Ultimate Test of Ashraf Marwan 30. In the Thick of the Yom Kippur War 31. The Soviet Nuclear Threat and Kissinger's Defcon-3 Epilogue: So What Went Wrong, and When? Sources Cited Abbreviations Notes

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